There is no consensus about whether exposure to a changing climate influences public concern about climate change. In this paper, we examine the link between climate change and public opinion using a comprehensive index of the mass public's latent concern about climate change in each state from 1999-2017. The index aggregates data from over 400,000 survey respondents in 170 polls. These new estimates of state-level climate concern enable us to exploit geographic variation in locally experienced climate changes over an extended time period. We show that climate concern peaked in 2000 and again in 2017. At the national level, trends in public opinion clearly mirror trends in temperature. Moreover, climate concern is modestly responsive to changes in state-level temperatures. Overall, our results suggest that continued increases in temperature are likely to cause public concern about climate change to grow in the future. But a warming climate, on its own, is unlikely to yield a consensus in the mass public about the threat posed by climate change.
Is the public's concern about climate change increasing as the planet warms? Understanding the link between experience with climate change and climate concern is important, since belief in climate change tends to be correlated with support for policies to address it (Egan and Mullin, 2017) . But identifying this link poses measurement challenges because the extent of warming varies considerably across the United States (Kaufmann, 2016) . Thus, assessing the relationship between climate change and climate concern demands a research design that both accounts for variation in Americans' exposure to climate change across geography and time and allows us to account for other factors, such as changes in the national economy, that might influence public opinion.
In this paper, we develop a new index of the mass public's concern about climate change in each state from 1999-2017. This comprehensive index enables us to identify the effect of exposure to climate change with a new level of robustness. It is also the first to show trends in climate concern at the state level, which is the level of opinion aggregation that matters most to state elected officials and members of Congress. Using these data and exploiting geographic variation in exposure to climate change, we show that higher temperatures lead to greater state-level concern about climate change. But a warming climate, on its own, is unlikely to yield a consensus in the mass public on climate change.
Background
Scholars have not definitively determined whether changes in the climate influence public opinion. This lack of consensus stems in part from inconsistencies in the extent to which scholars account for variation in exposure to climate change. A number of national or regional-level studies find inconsistent (Donner and McDaniels, 2013) or non-existent links between temperature trends and public opinion. However, these studies assume that individuals hundreds or thousands of miles apart experience climate change in the same way. Several studies examine the asso-ciation between subnational temperature and opinion over a short time frame and generally find short-lived but significant effects (e.g., Egan and Mullin, 2012; Kaufmann, 2016; Palm, Lewis, and Feng, 2017; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012, but see Mildenberger and Leiserowitz, 2017) . A strength of these studies is that they assess reactions to climate change at the level at which people actually experience it. However, these studies are capturing the effect of "attribute substitution": the use of weather anomalies as a biased heuristic for a changing climate (Egan and Mullin, 2014) . Thus, it is not clear what they imply about the link between annual temperature trends and public opinion.
Only a few studies have examined the effect of state or local variation in climate change over a longer time scale . Tantalizingly, these studies find a modest link between annual changes in temperature and public opinion. But they use small survey samples and sometimes find inconsistent effects across polls.
One of the main challenges to identifying the relationship between climate change and climate concern is measuring subnational public opinion over an extended time period. Many previous studies focus on a long-running series of questions about climate change on Gallup's Social Series (e.g., Figure 1 , panel a) Donner and McDaniels, 2013; . Despite its ubiquity in the literature, Figure 1 shows there are downsides of focusing exclusively on the Gallup series: the sample sizes are too small to produce state-level estimates, and the questions offer incomplete time coverage. Focusing on the Gallup surveys also leaves out dozens of other questions about climate change that have been asked on surveys.
Research Design
To address these limitations, we assembled a dataset of all publicly available survey data on climate change from 1999-2017. The dataset includes approximately 400,000 survey respondents from 170 individual polls. It includes questions about belief that climate change for prioritizing policies to address climate change. Figure 1 shows a sample of these questions, and a full list is provided in Supplementary Appendix A. Figure 1 indicates that trends in public opinion are highly correlated across survey questions.
To summarize this comprehensive dataset of public opinion on climate change, we use a group-level item response theory (IRT) model to generate an aggregate index of latent concern about climate change in each state/year between 1999 and 2017 .
1 No previous study has described trends in public opinion about climate at the state level, where they arguably matter most for legislators who respond to state, rather than national, constituencies. The long time frame from 1999 to 2017 provides sufficient statistical power to detect small effects of climate change on public opinion. It also ensures that any findings are generalizable beyond a particular snapshot in time. Our extended time period also enables us to examine whether the effect of temperature on public opinion is decreasing as the public grows more polarized.
We conduct a battery of analyses to examine whether changes in the climate of each state influence public opinion. First, we examine the effect of temperature on public opinion based on variation in the annual average of monthly average temperatures in each state.
Next, we examine five indicators of extreme events in each state that are linked to trends in precipitation: storms, short-and long-term drought severity, precipitation, and wildfires.
We standardize each extreme-events measure for comparability across indicators, and we lag all climate measures by one year to ensure that public opinion is measured post-treatment.
To isolate the effect on climate concern of citizens' exposure to climate change at the state-level from other time-varying confounders and to test the persistence of the effect, we estimate a series of increasingly nuanced time series, cross-sectional (TSCS) models. varying omitted variables and to determine whether the effect of temperature persists over time . We adjust our analyses to account for measurement error in our estimates of climate concern using a technique known as the "method of composition" or "propagated uncertainty" (Treier and Jackman, 2008) . 3 It is worth noting, however, that the year fixed effects also net out any changes in temperature or other climate indicators that are correlated across states. 4 The main consequence is to increase the uncertainty in our estimates of the effect of temperature on climate concern. In Supplementary Appendix F, we show regressions that are unadjusted for measurement error.
worries a 'great deal or fair amount' about climate change in Gallup's annual polls.
5 In addition, a one standard-deviation change in our latent scale is roughly equivalent to a 7% change in the number of people that worry about climate change. Overall, the upper panel of 6 While this association is large and implies a strong relationship between climate change and opinion, it could be confounded by any number of omitted variables. Moreover, there is high variation in locally experienced warming trends (Kaufmann, 2016) .
5 See Supplementary Figure C2 . 6 See Supplementary Appendix E. To address these limitations, we next examine the public's climate concern at the state level. Figure 3 shows how state-level concern about climate change has changed over the past 15 years. The figure conforms with prior research showing that the alignment between public opinion on climate change and partisanship has increased over the past two decades (e.g., Figure 4 : The effect of a one standard-deviation change in various climatic indicators on public opinion. The indicators are measured at the state level and refer, from top to bottom, to the annual average of monthly average temperature in degrees Celsius, the duration of storm events, annual average of monthly short-term drought, annual average of monthly long-term drought, reduction from median annual precipitation, and the (logged) acres that experienced wildfires.
change? We find that changes in annual-average temperatures have a small but robust effect on climate concern. Across specifications, a one-degree Celsius increase in temperature in a state relative to the nation leads to an increase of 0.12 -0.16 standard deviations in the state-level climate-concern index in the following year (Table 1 ). This effect implies that a one-degree Celsius increase in temperature causes an increase of about 1% in the number of people in a state that worry a 'great deal or fair amount' about climate change. 
Conclusion
There is no consensus in the literature about whether exposure to a changing climate influences the mass public's concern about climate change. To resolve this debate, we present the first estimates of trends in both national and state-level climate concern across nearly two decades. These estimates enable us to assess the relationship between indicators of a changing climate and public opinion with a new level of rigor. They also open new opportunities for robust research into the causes and consequences of climate concern at the state level.
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A challenge is that the survey questions on climate change differ in their content, wording, and response categories. For example, one question series asks in a single question whether climate change is occurring and whether human activities are causing it. Another series includes an initial question about the existence of climate change, coupled with a follow-up question about its causes. Only the subset of individuals who answered that climate change is occurring answered the follow-up question. Overall, our dataset includes 83 discrete question series in the seven categories shown in Supplementary Table 1. Supplementary Table   2 includes a paraphrase of each question series and the sources from which we include responses for each series.
Statistical Model for Index of Climate Opinion. To summarize all of this survey data on climate change, we use a hierarchical group-level IRT model, which estimates latent public opinion in population subgroups such as states . We build on prior work that has used multilevel modeling to measure state-level public opinion about the environment (Fowler, 2016; Eun Kim and Urpelainen, 2018 ). But our model allows us to combine multiple survey questions into an aggregate index of the public's climate concern.
In reducing our data to a single dimension, we follow prior studies that have used factor analysis (Zahran et al., 2006) or Stimson's mood algorithm to aggregate various measures into a single measure of public opinion about climate change.
Averaging multiple survey questions on global warming substantially reduces measurement error in our estimates of the public's concern about climate change.
The model adopts the general framework of item-response theory (IRT), which is com- Under this model, respondent i's probability of selecting the affirmative response to question q is
where the normal CDF Φ maps (θ i − K q )/σ q to the (0,1) interval. The model assumes that, the stronger someone's level of belief in climate change (higher values of θ i ), the higher their probability of answering q affirmatively. The strength of the relationship is inversely proportional to σ q , and the threshold for an affirmative response is governed by K q . By estimating the relationship of each question to the latent trait in this way, the model overcomes the lack of a single, valid time-varying measure of belief in climate change.
Since most surveys include only one or a few questions about climate change, each respondent usually only answers one question. This prevents us from using an IRT model to estimate individuals' belief. We can infer the distribution of θ i though. We model θ i in group g as distributed normally around the group meanθ g , and marginalize over the distribution of θ i . Assuming that θ i is normally distributed within subpopulation groups and given the normal ogive IRT model, the probability that a randomly sampled member of group g answers item q affirmatively is
whereθ g is the mean of θ i in group g, and σ θ is the within-group standard deviation of θ i .
In this way, rather than modeling the individual responses y iq , we model s gq = ngq i
the total number of affirmative answers to item q out of the n gq responses of subjects in group g. Also, we adjust the raw values of s gq and n gq to account for survey weights and for respondents who answer multiple questions ). To create state-level survey weights, we raked the survey data to match interpolated targets for gender, age, education level, and the percentage black in each state public, based on microdata from the U.S. Census (Ruggles et al., 2010) .
We use the dgo package in R to estimate group-level distributions and yearly group means of climate concern θ gq , for each state-year (Dunham, Caughey, and Warshaw, 2017) . 1 These estimates are subject to uncertainty, which we are also able to estimate at the state level using the distribution of state estimates across simulation iterations. We standardize our index of climate concern to be mean 0 with standard deviation of 1 at the state level.
Supplementary Appendix C: Validation of State-Level Climate Concern
To formally validate the state-level index of climate opinion, we compare it to the bestavailable published measures of state-level public opinion about climate change . These estimates use a Bayesian multi-level regression and post-stratification (MRP) model, using proprietary survey data from the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication. Supplementary Figure C1 shows the relationship between our index and these cross-sectional estimates of public opinion on five individual survey questions about climate change. Overall, we find that our index in 2012 has a correlation of between 0.85 and 0.88
with the five different state-level measures of belief in and concern about climate change that present. The high correlation with each of the individual climate questions modeled by suggests that latent climate concern is unidimensional.
Unlike the estimates from , which are available for just one year, our index of state-level opinion about climate change is available in each year from 1999-2017.
In order to validate the national trends in our estimates, we also compare the relationship between our climate concern index and the percentage of people worried about climate change on Gallup's annual polls (Figure C2) . The correlation between these annual measures is 0.84. This figure shows the relationship between our climate concern index and the percentage of people worried about climate change on Gallup's annual polls. The correlation between the annual measures is 0.84. The figure shows 95% confidence intervals to account for sampling error.
• a standardized precipitation index for each state. The Standardized Precipitation Index measures the probability of experiencing a given amount of precipitation in inches, transformed into an index. The measure ranges from -3 to +3, where 0 is the median. We have coded the variable such that +3 reflects a very extreme dry spell (Vose et al., 2014) .
• the natural log of the number of acres in each state that experienced wildfires (National Interagency Fire Center, 2017).
The temperature, precipitation, and drought data were all obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Global Historical Climatology Network. The wildfire data is from the National Interagency Fire Center. We lag each measure of climate change by one year to ensure that public opinion is measured post-treatment.
We use three basic time series, cross-sectional (TSCS) modeling strategies to identify the causal effect of changes in state-level temperature on public opinion. We first use a model with both state and year fixed effects (Equation 3). This allows us to control for both state and national-level confounders in order to isolate the causal effects of state variation in climate change. Crucially, the state fixed effects account for time-invariant omitted variables in each state, such as the general ideology or culture. This is important since political party and ideology have been found to be important predictors of public belief in anthropogenic climate change Borick and Rabe, 2010; . The year fixed effects account for unobserved factors that may influence climate concern across the nation, such as the debut of An Inconvenient Truth in 2006.
We use the equation:
where s and t index the states and years in our dataset, respectively. y st is latent state-level concern about anthropogenic climate change, T st−1 is an indicator of climate change in the previous year, β 1 is the effect of temperature, α is a vector of state fixed effects, ξ is a vector of year fixed effects, and is an error term.
Next, in Equation 4 we add linear time trends within each state . This allows us to account for smooth changes in state characteristics over time (such as ideological or economic changes) that might influence public attitudes about climate change.
Finally, in Equation 5, we use a specification with a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to capture other, time-varying omitted variables in each state and to determine whether the effect of temperature is persistent over time . The lagged dependent variable can be interpreted as a measure of the persistence of the effect of temperature on climate concern. This persistence can be estimated by dividing β 1 by 1-β 2 in Equation 5.
Our results indicate that β 2 = 0.11 (Main text, Table 1 ). This means that climate concern quickly adjusts to a value that is more strongly explained by last year's temperature than by the years preceding it. For example, 2015's temperature has about one tenth the effect on climate concern in 2017 as it has in 2016. Still, the effect cumulates over time such that the total long-term effect is about 1.1 times the size of the short-run effect (De Boef and Keele, 2008, 186) .
Finally, it is important to note that the within-state variation in temperature change used to estimate these effects (Mummolo and Peterson, 2018 ) is small. After accounting for nationally shared shifts and between-state variation in baseline temperature, the standard deviation of the temperature variable is 0.53 degrees celsius. This is a fraction of expected changes in global temperature, even under the best of circumstances in which we achieve the Paris Climate Accord's goal of limiting temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius. Thus, while our study shows that the public responds to changing temperatures, predicting the magnitude of the change that would be associated with future climate change is beyond the scope of the analysis.
Supplementary Appendix E: Association between NationalAverage Temperature and Public Opinion 
Supplementary Appendix G: Results by Time Period
To test the persistence of the effect over time, we split the time frame into 5-year increments and examine results for models 1 and 2 in each period. The results, reported in Table F1, indicate that the effect has persisted into the present, even in the face of growing polarization on climate change. 
